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The Global Shift to 5G: How to Leverage 
Bilateral Access Reciprocity Agreements to 







As the five times faster, twenty-five times more robust, 5G network 
becomes the global standard, behind China’s technological leadership in the 
space, telecommunications network security is of ever-increasing 
importance.  Since 2016, researchers have observed as China Telecom, a 
government-controlled telecommunications company with a large global 
presence, hijacked Internet traffic directed towards financial institutions, 
government sites, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and news organizations.  
The hijacks, which go largely undetected by victims, are possible anywhere 
a malicious actor has access to the technology that directs information from 
one location to another across the Internet.  As the United States and its allies 
evaluate options for sourcing 5G components and developing 5G 
infrastructure, domestic and international regulatory regimes must be 
adjusted to meet the risk.  Access Reciprocity agreements, which could be 
adopted in parallel or as an addendum to existing regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), would be likely to offset the threat of government sponsored cyber-
attacks.  That said, unless the U.S. and our allies put the same resources 
behind telecommunication innovation that our adversaries have, this 
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I.  Introduction 
 
As the five times faster, twenty-five times more robust, 5G network 
becomes the global standard, behind China’s leadership in the space, 
telecommunications network security is of ever-increasing importance.  
Telecommunications network hijacking is already commonplace.  With 
pressure to deploy 5G networks rapidly, risks to privacy and national security 
are becoming more pronounced.  As the new network is rolled out around 
the globe, demand for 5G access is leading to reliance on technically insecure 
components.  On top of an already insecure global telecommunications 
network, implementation of compromised 5G technology will present an 
unacceptable risk to domestic national security.  
Since 2016, researchers have observed as China Telecom, a government 
controlled telecommunications company with a large global presence, 
hijacked Internet traffic directed towards financial institutions, government 
sites, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and news organizations.1  The 
hijacks, which go largely undetected by victims, are possible anywhere a 
malicious actor has access to the technology that directs information from 
one location to another across the Internet.2  As the United States and its 
allies evaluate options for sourcing 5G components and developing 5G 
infrastructure, domestic and international regulatory regimes must be 
adjusted to meet the risk.  
Until the U.S. and its allies are able to produce the technology required 
of 5G networks at a competitive rate, the market will continue to push for 
access to the supplier with the fastest time to market, even where there is 
grave risk to privacy and national security.  Cellular data traffic has been 
increasing at an estimated compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 45% 
since 2016, meaning that data traffic doubles every 1.87 years.3  This 
estimated growth rate is exhausting existing wireless capacity and 
 
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2021 at the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law.  The author would like to thank Professor Chimène Keitner for supervising the drafting 
of this paper, and for her ongoing encouragement and patience.  The author would also like 
to thank John Dermody for early-stage brainstorming discussions, the HICLR team for their 
careful editing of this article, and my family for their unfailing support, especially through 
law school and the pandemic. 
 1. Chris C. Demchak & Yuval Shavitt, China’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point 
Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking, 3 M.C.A. (2018), 
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol3/iss1/7. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Thomas L. Jarvis & J.C. Masullo, 5G Wireless Communications, in THE INTERNET 
OF THINGS: LEGAL ISSUES, POLICY, AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 100 (Cynthia H. Cwik, 
Christopher Suarez & Lucy L. Thomson eds., 2019).   
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necessitating higher capacity data services.4  Compared to 4G LTE, fully 
implemented 5G is expected to enable system capacity by1,000 times; ten 
times the spectral efficiency and energy efficiency; twenty-five times the 
average cell throughput; ten times longer battery life of devices; five times 
reduced latency; and ubiquitous machine-to-machine (M2M), human-to-
machine, and human-to-human communications.5  
As of May 2020, Huawei, a Chinese Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICT) company with extensive government subsidies, had 
signed contracts for construction of 5G infrastructure in 30 countries, 
including Iceland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.6  Due in part to pressure 
from Washington, the United Kingdom has since announced that Huawei 
components will not be used to build 5G infrastructure, and that Huawei 
components currently in use will be removed by 2027.7  It is unclear what 
will follow, though British Digital Secretary Oliver Dowden stated that the 
ban could result in a cumulative cost of up to £2B and a two to three year 
delay in 5G rollout.8 
Considering the tension between market demand, national security, and 
economic interests, governments are faced with the important questions of 
who should be allowed to participate in the development and maintenance of 
domestic telecommunications infrastructure, and how that critical 
infrastructure can be protected from malicious actors.  As national security, 
economic, and technological priorities are increasingly intertwined, tensions 
arise, and both domestic entities as well as international regulatory bodies 
are forced to implement and restructure relevant policies and tactics.9  That 
said, where new policies prohibit the purchase of goods from certain 
vendors, it is essential that there is an equally impactful incentive for firms 
to develop secure telecommunications technology either domestically or in 
ally countries.  Otherwise, the prohibitive policies risk impeding domestic 
industrial and economic interests in the name of national security.  
It’s important to acknowledge upfront the distinctly U.S. lens of this 
paper, and to address a few preconceptions that flow from that perspective.  
Broadly speaking, it is politically untenable in the U.S. for the government 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 104. 
 6. John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Slayer, National Security Implications of Fifth 
Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies. CRS. (February 24, 2020), https://crsreports. 
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11251. 
 7. Huawei: China Attacks UK’s “Groundless” Ban of 5G Kit, BBC, (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53412678. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Commerce Seeks Comment on Telecom Supply Chain Review Process, O’Melveny, 
(December 3, 2019), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/client- 
alert-commerce-seeks-comment-on-telecom-suplly-chain-review-process/. 
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to intervene in the market despite the fact that many such policies exist.  
Regardless, we must reevaluate the hands-off policy approach.  The global 
economy is a different playing field when the number two player is not only 
an aggressor but operates under a different value system as it pertains to 
economic competition, democracy, privacy rights, and intellectual property 
rights. 
This paper provides (1) a technical walk-through, including definitions 
of network components and a description of how cellular networks operate; 
(2) an explanation of how networks are hijacked and the risks associated with 
hijacking; (3) an overview of 5G technology and why we need it; (4) the 
landscape of international and U.S. domestic telecommunications policy; 
and (5) an evaluation of Access Reciprocity as a solution to national security 
and economic vulnerabilities.  
Access Reciprocity agreements, which could be adopted in parallel or 
as an addendum to existing regional trade agreements (RTAs), would be 
likely to offset the threat of government sponsored cyber-attacks.  That said, 
unless the U.S. and our allies put the same resources behind 
telecommunication innovation that our adversaries have, this approach could 
stunt the U.S.’s competitive edge in other sectors.  
 
II.  Cellular Network Components and How They Work 
 
Effectively evaluating policy options for telecommunications security 
requires a basic understanding of the technologies and actors involved in 
contemporary networks.  A high-level technological overview, at minimum, 
is essential to determining the extent to which adversaries should be allowed 
to interact with domestic networks.  
Contemporary cellular networks have three main components: The 
Radio Access Network (RAN) that communicates over the air, the Core 
Network (CN) that connects the RAN network to control services and 
external services, and the Users’ Equipment (UE), which includes mobile 
phones.10  RANs have a base station that encodes and formats data and an 
antenna that transmits data.11  The CN links that RAN to the cellular 
operator’s internal control systems and to external systems like landline 
telephones, Internet, SMS texting, and other cellular systems.12 
In terms of actors, networks include remote individual users, ISPs, and 
telecommunication service providers.  The loci that connect ISPs based in 
 
 10. Jarvis, supra, note 3 at 100. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
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different geographies are called network access points (NAPs).13  The loci 
that connect remote users to communications networks are called Points of 
Presence (PoPs). 14  “[A] PoP is the point at which two or more different 
networks or communication devices build a connection with each other.  PoP 
mainly refers to an access point, location, or facility that connects to and 
helps other devices establish a connection with the Internet.”15  PoPs are 
usually located in data centers and hold multiple servers, routers, and other 
interface equipment.16  
Hijacking the Internet requires the ability to manipulate aspects of 
contractual and regulatory agreements that dictate who moves information 
packets to whom across the Internet.17  The Internet is made up of tens of 
thousands of Autonomous Systems (each one individually known as an AS), 
which are independently managed networks connected through peer-to-pay 
contractual agreements.18  Each AS independently controls access to and 
from its internal network nodes.19  A user inside one AS can communicate 
with a user in a different AS through the first user’s own AS gateway 
servers.20  An illustrative example is a university network whose students 
connect to other students by routers inside the university’s network and 
connect to others outside the network by passing through the university’s 
gateway servers.21 
A small number of very large Autonomous Systems form the “tier 1” 
or “backbone” of the global Internet.22  Those large ASs typically establish 
reciprocal peering agreements to share massive volumes of traffic without 
paying transit fees.23  All other ASs must pay or negotiate for packet 
transfers.24  Telecommunications companies own and operate the major PoPs 
 
 13. Margaret Rouse, Network Access Point (NAP), TECHTARGET, (April 2005), 
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/network-access-point-NAP 
14.Point of Presence (PoP), TECHOPEDIA, (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.techo 
pedia.com/definition/1704/point-of-presence-pop. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Michael Isberto, What is a Point of Presence (PoP)?, COLOCATION AMERICA (Sept. 
24, 2019), https://www.colocationamerica.com/blog/point-of-presence?amp. 
 17. Demchak, supra, at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Hari Balkrishnan, Wide-Area Internet Routing, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2 (January 2009), 
https://web.mit.edu/6.033/www/papers/InterdomainRouting.pdf. 
 24. Demchak, supra, at 2. 
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that connect traffic across ASs.25  This means that telecoms control the major 
nodes of global internet traffic flow.26 
The movement of data traffic requires that both senders and recipients 
have their own address.  Each AS is assigned an Autonomous System 
Number (ASN) to identify itself globally for the receipt of information 
packets.27  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designates 
each AS a block of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.28  If the AS is also an 
ISP, the AS further assigns some of its IP addresses to home users and other 
IP addresses in blocks to business customers.29 
Information is sent across intervening ASs as small data packets with 
destination IP addresses attached.30  Each router in the transited network 
looks at the destination IP address in the packet and forwards it to the next 
and closest AS according to a forwarding table.31  There are two forms of 
software protocols involved: Internet Protocol (IP) and Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP).32 
The pathway for any data packet is based on multiple economic and 
engineering factors but a key consideration is distance.  Shorter distances are 
uniformly preferred.33  As mentioned above, the forwarding tables provide 
the next and closest AS router for a given packet to cross.  The servers 
hosting the BGP build the forwarding tables and share them across 
contributing ASs.34  Within the BGP forwarding tables, ASs announce to 
other ASs the IP address blocks that belong to them so that the AS can be 
used as a destination or transit node.35 
 
III.  Threats to Internet Security 
 
A.  Internet Hijacking and How It Occurs 
 
Given the complexity of configuring a BGP, errors occur.36  The 
possibility of errors offers malicious actors the opportunity to hijack data 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 3.  
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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transfer routes without being detected.37  “If network AS1 mistakenly 
announces through its BGP that it owns an IP block that is actually owned 
by network AS2, traffic from a portion of the Internet destined for AS2 will 
… be routed to – and through – AS1.  If the erroneous announcement was 
maliciously arranged, then a BGP hijack has occurred.”38  
Most BGP hijacks are the work of government agencies or large 
criminal organizations with access to, leverage over, or control of ISPs and 
strategically placed PoPs.  For example, in 2008, the tier 1 AS for Pakistan 
accidentally hijacked all YouTube traffic for several hours in an attempt to 
censor a non-Islamic clip within its borders.39  Another example is the 
intentional hijack that occurred on April 8, 2010, when China Telecom 
hijacked 15% of Internet traffic for eighteen minutes in what is believed to 
be both a large-scale test and a demonstration of China’s ability to control 
the flow of information over the Internet.40 
Orchestrating a BGP hijack is complex but becomes easier when a 
complicit, largescale ISP is likely to be a central point of transit.41  
Researchers at BGProtect, an organization associated with the DIMES 
project at Tel Aviv University, built a route tracing system that monitors 
BGP announcements and distinguishes patterns that suggest accidental or 
deliberate hijacking.42  Using this approach, Tel Aviv University professor 
Yuval Shavitt and Director of the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the 
U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Chris C. Demchak, observed systematic 
hijacking patterns associated with China Telecom.  
Hijacking attacks are particularly dangerous because they target critical 
exchanges of information.43  In a hijack, sensitive data flows across 
adversary networks with little detection by the victim network’s 
administrators. The hijacks give the attacker access to the victim 
organization’s network and provide an opportunity to steal data, add 
malicious implants to seemingly normal traffic, or modify or corrupt data.44  
In order to have global reach, attackers need to use a network that has a 
global presence so that the network they’re using is not too far from any 
potential victim network.  “The closer a network is to the attacker or 
complicit ISP, the more likely an attack will succeed because defending 
administrators are less likely to have enough time to detect, analyze, and 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Id. 
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mitigate the attack.” 45  A government that seeks to hijack the 
telecommunications networks of an adversary will need to own or control 
networks with a broad geographical spread.46 
 
1.  Examples of Internet Hijacking: China Telecom in North America  
 
Since entering North American networks in the early 2000’s, China 
Telecom has grown to control ten PoPs in the United States and Canada 
(eight in the U.S. and two in Canada).47  The China Telecom PoPs span both 
coasts and all major exchange points in the U.S. Few other foreign ISPs have 
such a presence on U.S. soil.48  
The researchers at BGProtect observed how China Telecom leveraged 
their numerous PoPs to accomplish major sensitive data reroutes in 2016 and 
2017.49  In February 2016, China Telecom hijacked routes from Canada to 
Korean government sites so that the sensitive data flowed through China.  
The normal transit route was Toronto-Maryland-Korea.  After the hijack, the 
information flowed from a China Telecom POP in Toronto, to another China 
Telecom PoP on the West Coast of the U.S., to China, and then finally to its 
destination in Korea.  This particular hijack lasted for six months and was 
repeated afterward for shorter durations.50  
In October 2016, China Telecom attempted a similar hijack, this time 
with a large Anglo-American bank headquartered in Italy.51  The attack 
started at a ChinaNet (a wholly owned subsidiary of China Telecom) PoP 
near Los Angeles.52  The traffic was rerouted to China but was unsuccessful 
as, after nine hours, the traffic never made it to its ultimate destination in 
Milan.53 
Several other hijacks were recorded in 2017, including that of a large 
American news organization whose traffic was hijacked in Scandinavia and 
redirected through China on its way to Japan.54  Another involved a mail 
server of a large financial company in Thailand whose traffic was hijacked 
at a ChinaNet PoP in California.55  The ISP attack affected at least two large 
 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 4. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id.; see also ChinaNet Access, China Telecom Americas, (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.ctamericas.com/products-services/internet/chinanet-access/.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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U.S. mail server providers and occurred in parallel to an attack on several 
major providers in South Korea.56  These attacks spanned hours to weeks and 
were repeated multiple times throughout 2017.57 
 
B.  Other Security Vulnerabilities 
 
As described above, cellular networks have two primary elements 
(excluding individual user equipment): the core network that provides the 
gateway to the Internet, and the RAN, which is composed of cell towers that 
broadcast and receive radio signals.  This is important because some analysts 
believe that while the risk posed by Chinese access to core networks is 
significant, as illustrated by the research of BGProtect, the risk posed by 
access to the RAN is manageable. 58  Others argue that any Chinese 
equipment in the network poses meaningful security risks.59  Some analysts 
even go as far as to suggest that the U.S. should limit intelligence sharing 
with any country operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment.60  
Since the FCC authorized China Telecom to operate 
telecommunications services from within the U.S. in 2007, various agencies 
concerned with national and trade security have become aware of China’s 
role in malicious cyber activity against the United States.61  The Department 
of Justice’s National Security Division, Foreign Investment Review Section, 
identified the following compliance issues through its mitigation monitoring 
program: Inaccurate statements by China Telecom to U.S. government 
authorities about where the company stores U.S. records, raising questions 
about who has access to those records; inaccurate public statements by China 
Telecom regarding its cybersecurity practices, raising questions about China 
Telecom’s compliance with cybersecurity and privacy laws and the nature 
of China Telecom’s U.S. operations, which provide opportunities for 
Chinese state-actors to commit economic espionage, and disruption and 
rerouting of U.S. communications, as described above.62  This is all part of a 
 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Hoehn, supra note 6.Technologies. CRS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://crsreports. 
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11251. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC 
Revoke and Terminate China Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International 
Telecommunications Services in the United States (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-branch-agencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-china-
telecom-s-authorizations. 
 62. Id.  
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broader concern that China Telecom is vulnerable to exploitation, influence, 
and control by the Chinese government.63 
When considering whether permitting any Chinese telecommunications 
technologies to exist in one’s own nation is safe, it’s worth taking a look at 
China’s domestic policies concerning intelligence gathering.  In 2017, ten 
years after China Telecom was permitted to establish a presence in the U.S., 
China enacted a National Intelligence Law.64  The law states that “any 
organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide 
assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy 
of any national intelligence work that they are aware of.”65  Many analysts 
interpret the law as requiring telecommunications companies to cooperate 
with the Chinese government’s intelligence gathering efforts by installing 
backdoors or handing private data over to the government.66  
 
IV.  Fifth Generation (5G) Wireless Communication Technologies 
 
As telecommunications technology increases in sophistication and 
capability, it is imperative that nations deploy 5G in a globally competitive 
timeframe in order to support the innovation enabled by this infrastructure 
while also preserving national security, intellectual property, and privacy.  
With that in mind, it is helpful to understand what 5G is and why it so 
important. 
By way of background, early wireless mobile communications were 
enabled by propriety radio interfaces that did not support roaming to non-
proprietary networks.67  Mobility was limited to the geographic area of the 
subscriber’s carrier and roaming to other networks using the same or other 
technologies was not generally available.68  Voluntary governmental 
Standards Setting Organizations (SSOs) established radio interface 
technologies that facilitated roaming, enabling multiple infrastructure and 
mobile phone providers to ensure compatibility of their products.69  Among 
multiple competing SSOs are the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).70  
The ITU is part of the UN and sets high level technology goals.71  The ETSI’s 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Hoehn, supra note 6. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 97. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 98. 
 70. Id. 
 71. About International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ITU (May 22, 2020) https:// 
www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx. 
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3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) develops specifications for the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and the follow-on 
specifications for LTE and 5G.72   
The first 4G network was deployed in 2010.73  Technical specifications 
for 4G networks require high data transmission speeds, high aggregate data 
capacity for all users within a cell, and low latency.74  These capabilities 
made possible the first practical large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) systems.  
Beyond IoT, the performance expectation was that 4G would support mobile 
Internet Protocol telephony (IP telephony), gaming services, high-definition 
mobile TV, video conferencing, and 3D television.75  It’s worth mentioning 
that Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is the predominate 4G wireless 
technology.76  
As stated earlier, cellular data traffic has been increasing at an estimated 
CAGR of 45% since 2016, meaning that data traffic doubles every 1.87 
years.77  This estimated growth rate is exhausting existing wireless capacity, 
thereby necessitating higher capacity data services.  Rather than completely 
replacing existing systems, 5G will add an additional layer of connectivity 
for high-demand applications.78 
The ITU began planning for 5G in 2012 with complete network 
specifications targeted for 2020, the specification became known as 
International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 (IMT 2020).79  On June 4, 
2018, 3GPP released specifications for 5G NR for mobile users and 5G Core 
Network (5GC).80 
 
 72. Jarvis, 5G Wireless Communications, supra, at 98. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. See, ITU-R Report M.2134, Requirements Related to Technical Performance for 
IMT-Advanced Radio Interface(s) (2008), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-
M.2134-2008-PDF-E.pdf; Grace Petrin, Radiocommunication Sector ITU-R FAQ on 
International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) (May 9, 2018), available at http://www 
.itu.int/en/ITU-R/Documents/ITU-R-FAQ-IMT.pdf. 
 75. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 98; see also Petra, supra note 74. 
 76. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 99. 
 77. Id. at 99-100; Paul Schmitt & Elizabeth Belding, Low on Air: Inherent Wireless 
Channel Capacity Limitations, LIMITS (June 22-24, 2017), available at https://www. 
cs.princeton.edu/~pschmitt/docs/limits02-schmittA.pdf. 
 78. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 100; Fredric Kronestedt et al., The Advantages of Combining 
5G NR with LTE, 9 ERICSSON TECH. REV. (Oct. 30, 2018), available at https://www. 
ericsson.com/assets/local/publications/ericsson-technology-review/docs/2018/etr-2018-09-
5g-radiodeployment.pdf. 
 79. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101; see also, e.g., ITU towards “IMT for 2020 and Beyond”, 
ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/study-groups/rsg5/rwp5d/imt-2020/Pages/default.aspx (last 
accessed Dec. 14, 2018). 
 80. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101. 
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The ITU’s IMT 2020 specification classified 5G mobile network 
services into three groups targeted at different use cases: eMBB, URLLC, 
and mMTC. 81  eMBB (Enhanced Mobile Broadband) is a “bigger pipe” that 
provides high data/bandwidth throughput.82  eMBB supports services like 
high-definition videos, virtual reality, and augmented reality.83  URLLC 
(Ultra-Reliable and Low-Latency Communications) facilitates “higher 
pressure” data flows for near instantaneous (<1 ms) reactions, enabling 
latency-sensitive services.84  Supported use cases for URLLC include remote 
surgery, assisted and automated driving, and manufacturing robotics.85  
mMTC (Massive Machine-Type Communications) enables high-density 
pipeline communications (<1M/km2 connections).86  This service is 
appropriate for smart cities, smart agriculture, and other use cases involving 
tens of thousands of connected devices.87   
Compared to 4G LTE, fully implemented 5G should deliver the 
following benefits: 1,000 times the system capacity; 10 times the spectral 
efficiency and energy efficiency; 25 times the average cell throughput; 10 
times longer battery life; 5 times reduced latency; and ubiquitous (M2M), 
human-to-machine, and human-to-human communications.88   
According to some sources, there is still a long way to go in developing 
a global, commercially available 5G network.  The term “5G” is used broadly 
in the U.S. and has the marketing function of referring to faster, higher-
capacity service.89  This has led to many carriers branding incremental 
changes to existing infrastructure as such. 90  In spite of marketing efforts, 
full implementation of 5G will take five years or more.91 
 
 81. Id. at 102; Heejung Yu, et al., What Is 5G? Emerging 5G Mobile Services and 
Network Requirements, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 1848 (Oct. 15, 2017), available at 
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/9/10/1848/pdf. 
 82. Id. at 103. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 103-4; Rony K. Saha & Chaodit Aswakul, Fundamentals of 5G Mobile 
Network: Architecture, Requirement, Densification, Cooperation, and Resource Management 
(July 2016), Sec 2.2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305536508_FUNDAMENT 
ALS_OF_5G_MOBILE_NETWORK_Architecture_Requirement_Densification_Cooperati
on_and_Resource_Management. 
 89. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101. 
 90. Id. at 102; Ferry Grijpink et al., The Road to 5G: The Inevitable Growth of 
Infrastructure Cost, MCKINSEY (Feb. 2018), htps://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
telecommunications/our-insights/the-road-to-5g-the-inevitable-growth-of-infrastucture-cost. 
 91. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 102. 
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There are a number of firms making incredible strides in producing 5G 
infrastructure.  Among the most powerful are Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson.92  
Huawei is the largest supplier of communications technology in the world.93  
To date, Huawei has signed contracts for construction of 5G infrastructure 
in 30 countries, including Iceland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.94  The 
United States banned the use of Huawei hardware in government projects 
because of the company’s suspected involvement in Chinese cyberattack and 
intelligence-gathering operations.95  In July 2020, the United Kingdom, amid 
a rhetorical firestorm, also implemented a Huawei ban, citing national 
security interests that China claims are unfounded.96  Reports find that 
Huawei has benefitted from as much as $75B in state support.97  
Nokia is a Finnish multinational telecommunication, information 
technology, and consumer electronics firm.  Several of the company’s recent 
acquisitions have brought Nokia to a position of leadership in 5G 
networking.98  In 2018, Nokia contracted with T-Mobile to provide the 
mobile carrier with 5G network infrastructure in a deal worth $3.5B, which 
at the time was the largest 5G deal in the world.99  In addition to its contract 
with T-Mobile, Nokia has over 20 agreements with other 
telecommunications providers world-wide, including AT&T, Vodafone, and 
Optus.100  As of 2018, Nokia had engaged in approximately 100 individual 
trials of 5G technology, including operational efficiency tests in South Korea 
and the launch of a 5G-based home internet service in Australia.101 
Ericsson is similarly aggressive in the 5G space.  The Swedish 
telecommunications giant is developing a proprietary 5G technology 
called Ericsson Spectrum Sharing, which “relies on algorithms to efficiently 
allocate spectrum bandwidth across 4G and 5G networks in line with 
 
 92. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity, 
CBInsights, (April 23, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporations-5g-future-
connectivity/. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Hoehn, supra note 6. 
 95. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity, 
supra note 92. 
 96. Huawei: China Attacks UK’s “Groundless” Ban of 5G Kit, supra note 7.  
 97. Chuin-Wei Yap, State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise, The Wall Street 
Journal (Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis- 
global-rise-11577280736. 
 98. Our History, Nokia, (May 5, 2020), https://www.nokia.com/about-us/what-we-
do/our-history/. 
 99. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity, 
CBInsights, (April 23, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporations-5g-future-
connectivity/. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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network traffic.”102  As of spring 2019, Ericsson entered into at least ten 
formal 5G contracts with various service providers around the world.103  
Ericsson advertises 5G development projects with AT&T, China Mobil, 
Deutche Telecom, Korea Telecom, Turkcell, TeliaSonera, Verizon, and 
Vodafone.104 
 
V.  Telecommunications Network Security Policy 
 
A.  Traditional Policy Approaches 
 
There are a variety of different approaches governments can take to 
protect various aspects of their telecommunications networks.  Among the 
most common are tariffs, localization requirements, IP related measures, 
national standards-and-conformity assessments, and ICT supply chain 
restrictions.105 
Historically, policymakers focused on tariffs as the method by which 
governments could attempt to protect domestic economic interests or 
influence the policies of would-be trade partners.  At present, most nations 
do not levy tariffs on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
products because of existing Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA).106  
Some governments institute localization requirements that in some 
instances bolster cybersecurity but are often designed to favor domestic 
service providers.107  Localization requirements are defined as “measures 
that compel companies to conduct certain digital-trade-related activities 
within a country’s borders.”108  Some governments bar data transfer 
altogether while others require that a copy of the data is stored within its 
territory.109  While the justifications for localization policies include 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Shaping History, Ericsson, (May 5, 2020), https://www.ericsson.com/en/about-
us/history/shaping-history. 
 105. Rachel F. Fefer et al., Digital Trade and U.S. Trade Policy, CRS, 12 (May 21, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdf. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. Id. at 13; U.S. International Trade Commission, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global 
Economies, Part 1, Publication No: 4415, Investigation No: 332-531, 16 (July 2013), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf. 
 109. Mark Wu, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing 
Models and Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System, RTA Exchange, 23 (November 2017), 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-Mark-
Wu-Final.pdf. 
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protecting citizens’ data and ensuring law enforcement’s access to 
information, many nations worry that the policies are protectionist, 
especially as data become increasingly valuable.110  For that reason, several 
nations use Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to ban localization 
requirements.111  That said, even where localization policies are not strictly 
protectionist, the requirements only address some of the potential threats to 
secure telecommunications, national security, and economic interests.  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and IPR related measures can protect 
domestic economic interests as well as promote innovation, but they can also 
function similarly to localization requirements when used to disadvantage 
foreign companies.112  That said, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC) exercises the authority of the legislative and executive branches to bar 
importation of technology that infringes on a U.S. patent under 19 U.S.C. 
§337.113  Of all section 337 complaints that are filed, about one in three is 
filed by a non-U.S.-based company.114  The ITC has in rem jurisdiction over 
all products imported into the U.S., and with the relocation of semiconductor 
and electronics manufacturing to Asia, most telecommunications products 
fall within the ITS’s jurisdiction.115  Unfortunately, IPR related measures do 
little to protect a nations interest when violations go undetected or when 
agreements are circumvented by adversaries, such as in the case of the Xi-
Obama antitheft agreement of 2015.116 
Another approach is the implementation of local or national technology 
standards and testing requirements that differ significantly from international 
standards.117  While these requirements can improve cybersecurity, they can 
also make it difficult for technology firms to enter particular markets where 
products cannot connect, and can burden companies by delaying time to 
market and forcing additional expenses.118   
Finally, governments can significantly restrict or flat out prohibit the 
purchase of ICT goods from particular companies or countries.  This is the 
 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 24. 
 112. Fefer, supra note 105, at 17. 
 113. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 119. 
 114. Id. at 120; KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2012). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Demchak, supra note 1, at 1. 
 117. Fefer, supra note 105, at 17. 
 118. Id.; USTR, 2019 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 242 
(March 2019). 
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most extreme measure as it can amount to a total barrier to trade.  An 
example of such a policy can be found below in Executive Order 13873.119 
 
B.  Current U.S. Domestic Policy 
 
It is suspected that China has been pursuing cyber-capabilities directed 
at U.S. national security interests for decades.120  In recent years, the U.S. 
has had to work quickly to manage the threat to our national security, 
economic, and technological interests posed by China’s ability to steal 
information from the United States.  Of primary importance to the security 
of U.S. and U.S. allies’ telecommunications systems are the 2015 Xi-Obama 
agreement, Trump’s Executive Order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (which 
encompasses the 5G FAST Plan), and the revocation of China Telecom 
permissions that occurred in April 2020. 
 
1.  2015 Xi-Obama Agreement 
 
During President Xi Jingping’s visit to Washington in September 2015, 
the United States and China agreed “that neither country’s government will 
conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, 
including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the 
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial 
sectors.”121  From the perspective of some, the so called 2015 Xi-Obama 
antitheft agreement forced the Chinese government to find new ways of 
getting information from foreign nations, and many in the U.S. and other 
nations viewed Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE with suspicion.122  
Data suggests China was able to leverage seemingly innocuous service 
providers to bypass the 2015 agreement without notice and gain access to 
information.123  
Furthermore, while the Xi-Obama agreement prohibited direct attacks 
on computer networks, it did nothing to prevent the hijacking of Internet 
infrastructure.  As previously discussed, China Telecom has ten PoPs across 
the internet backbone of North America. “Vast rewards can be reaped from 
 
 119. Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019). 
 120. John W. Rollins, U.S.-China Cyber Agreement, Fed’n of Am. Scientists (Oct. 16, 
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf. 
 121. Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, The White House 
President Barack Obama (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
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the hijacking, diverting, and then copying of information-rich traffic going 
into or crossing the United States and Canada – often unnoticed and then 
delivered with only small delays.”124   
After the signing of Xi-Obama agreement, China transitioned from a 
strategy of military-initiated cybertheft to cybertheft committed by 
commercial service providers (highlighting the different economic and 
political ideologies between China and the U.S. mentioned in the 
introduction of this paper).  This strategic shift necessitates a response from 
the U.S. in the form of policy changes.  These changes have been slow 
coming as it has taken several years to detect and respond to BGP Hijacks 
and other related threats. 
 
2.  Executive Order (E.O.) 13873 On Securing the ICT and ICT          
….Services Supply  Chain 
 
On May 15, 2019, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order 
on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services 
Supply Chain.125  The order prohibits transactions involving information and 
communications technologies or services “designed, developed, 
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary,” where those transactions pose an 
undue or unacceptable risk to critical infrastructure in the United States, 
United States National Security, or the United States Economy.126 
 
3.  March 2020 National Strategy to Secure 5G 
 
The spring of 2020 brought an onslaught of government statements and 
publicized strategies concerning the secure development of 5G infrastructure 
in the United States.  Among the first was the White House’s “National 
Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America” (the Strategy).  The 
Strategy provides a general description of the risks discussed earlier in this 
paper, and outlines four “lines of effort” that dictate how the government is 






 124. Id.  
 125. Trump supra note at 119. 
 126. Id. 
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a.  Line of Effort #1: Facilitating Domestic 5G Rollout and the 5G 
FAST Plan 
 
The first Line of Effort that the administration discusses is the 
facilitation of a “private sector-led rollout of 5G, primarily coordinated by 
the National Economic Council.”127  The Strategy goes on to describe the 
FCC’s Facilitate America’s Superiority in 5G Technology plan, also known 
as the 5G FAST Plan, which was issued September 28, 2018.128  This plan 
consists of three major goals: license more 5G-specific spectrum for 
commercial use, update infrastructure policies, and “modernize” existing 
regulations to promote deployment of 5G.129  
Since the FAST Plan was set in motion in 2018, the FCC released 
spectrum licenses as follows: in January 2019, the FCC closed the auction of 
28GHz spectrum licenses;130 in June 2019, the FCC closed the auction of 
24GHz;131 and on March 12, 2020, the FCC concluded the largest spectrum 
auction in U.S. history, making available 3,400 megahertz of millimeter-
wave spectrum in the Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz bands across 99% 
of available licenses.132  It’s worth mentioning that all the spectrum licenses 
that have been released for use in commercial 5G networks to date are above 
6GHz, which are the bands that provide impressive capacity and enable 
massive channel sizes capable of delivering multi-gigabit connectivity.133  
Auctions of mid-band 5G spectrum originally scheduled for the end of June 
of this year (2020) have been postponed until the end of July 2020 in light 
of the economic downturn caused by the novel coronavirus.134  Those 
auctions are underway as of the writing of this paper.135 
 
 127. Donald J. Trump, National Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America, 
The White House (Mar. 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ 
National-Strategy-5G-Final.pdf. 
 128. The FCC’s 5G FAST Plan, fcc.gov, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
354326A1.pdf. 
 129. Trump, supra note 127, at 2. 
 130. Auction 101: Spectrum Frontiers – 28 GHz, fcc.gov, (May 5, 2020), https://www. 
fcc.gov/auction/101. 
 131. Auction 102 Closing Public Notice, Federal Communications Commission (May 28, 
2019), https://www.fcc.gov/document/auction-102-closing-public-notice. 
 132. Katie Gorscak, FCC Concludes Largest Ever Spectrum Auction, Advancing 
American Leadership in 5G, FC News from the Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 
12, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363000A1.pdf. 
 133. Jarvis, supra note 3 at 106. 
 134. Diana Goovaerts, FCC Delays 3.5 GHz Auction, Mobile World Live (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/fcc-delays-3-5ghz-auction/. 
 135. Auction 105: 3.5 GHz, Federal Communications Commission Public Reporting 
System, https://auctiondata.fcc.gov/public/projects/auction105 (July 23, 2020); see also Will 
Wiquist, FCC Starts First 5G Mid-Band Spectrum Auction Today, FC News from the Federal 
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As part of updating infrastructure policies to encourage private-sector 
investment in 5G, the FCC has taken steps to speed up federal review of 
small cells (as opposed to large cell towers) as well as state and local reviews 
of small cells.136  This change distinguishes between large and small wireless 
facilities.  On the federal level, this means the following: small wireless 
facilities deployed on non-Tribal lands are excluded from National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
review; the process for Tribal participation in Section 106 historic 
preservation reviews for large wireless facilities where NHPA and NEPA 
review is required will be clarified; the requirement that applicants file 
Environmental Assessments solely due to the location of a proposed facility 
in a floodplain no longer applies if certain conditions are met; and there are 
now firm timeframes for the Commission to act on Environmental 
Assessments.137  
The “modernization of outdated regulation” involves four key orders: 
Restoring Internet Freedom; Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment 
by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, which covers Intellectual 
Property (IP) issues as well as equipment regulation updates; Business Data 
Services; and Protecting Against National Security Threats to the 
Communications Supply Chain.138 
The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Declaratory Ruling reverses 
FCC utility-style regulations implemented in 2015, thought to impose 
substantial costs on the Internet industry and hinder innovation, and 
reinstates the Title I classification of broadband Internet access under the 
Communications Act.139  Meanwhile, the associated Report and Order 
requires ISPs to disclose information about any blocking, throttling, paid 
prioritization, or affiliated prioritization to consumers, entrepreneurs, and the 
FCC.140  The Report and Order also eliminates the Internet Conduct 
Standard, finding that transparency, market forces, and antitrust and 





Communications Commission (July 23, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
365702A1.pdf. 
 136. The FCC’s 5G FAST Plan, supra note 126. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. FCC Releases Restoring Internet Freedom Order, Federal Communications 
Commission (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-
freedom-order. 
 140. Id. at 130. 
 141. Id. at 143. 
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b.  Line of Effort #2: Assessing Risk and Identifying Security Principles 
 
The Strategy’s Line of Effort #2 describes on a high level the U.S. 
government’s plans to coordinate interagency and private sector 
collaboration to determine, develop, and implement core security principles 
to United States 5G infrastructure.142  The Strategy also refers to “The Prague 
Proposals”, which are an unsigned but generally agreed upon list of 
guidelines for 5G development that resulted from the Prague 5G Security 
Conference in May 2019.143  The Prague Proposals consist of four categories 
of recommendations, each of which emphasizes the importance of 
technology, policy, and security collaboration in an economically and 
technologically viable 5G market.144 
 
c.  Line of Effort #3: Addressing 5G Infrastructure Risks to Security  
 
Line of Effort #3 describes the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain 
Security Act of 2018 (the Act) as well as E.O. 13873 on “Securing the 
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” 
which was discussed earlier in this paper.145  The Act established the Federal 
Acquisition Security Council, whose role is to develop supply chain risk 
management standards, guidelines, and practices for executive agencies.  
The Act also provides a structure for preventing the use and procurement of 
potentially dangerous sources or covered articles in executive agency 
information systems.146  As discussed above, E.O. 13873 goes a step further 
by prohibiting transactions involving information and communications 
technologies or services “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by 







 142. Trump, supra note 127, at 3. 
 143. Id.; see also H.R. Res. 575, 116th Cong. (2019) (Expressing the sense of the House 
of Representatives that all stakeholders in the deployment of 5G communications 
infrastructure should carefully consider adherence to the recommendations of “The Prague 
Proposals”). 
 144. H.R. Res. 575, 116th Cong. (2019), supra note 143. 
 145. Trump, supra note 127, at 4. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
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d.   Line of Effort #4: Global Development and Deployment of 5G 
Infrastructure 
 
The Strategy’s final Line of Effort highlights the necessity of 
international cooperation in the implementation of telecommunications 
security measures.  The Strategy promises that the U.S. will continue to 
participate in the development of international 5G security principles, 
similarly to its participation in the Prague 5G Security Conference, and that 
the government will work with commercial, academic, and other 
international partners to accomplish the implementation of these 
standards.148  
 
4.  Revoking China Telecom Authorizations  
 
On April 9, 2020, the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, 
Defense, State, Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative 
unanimously recommended that the FCC revoke and terminate China 
Telecom’s authorizations to provide telecommunications services to and 
from the United States.149  In its recommendation, these agencies identified 
“substantial and unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks 
associated with China Telecom’s operations, which render the FCC 
authorizations inconsistent with the public interest.”150 
 
C.  Existing International Agreements 
 
Because no single telecommunications provider covers the entire globe, 
telecommunication networks must connect across borders to transmit 
information.  This requires open channels of trade and uniform security 
measures.  The interconnectedness of the global telecommunications 
network necessarily means that security vulnerabilities in one network can 
result in security vulnerabilities for those whose information is originally 
transmitted by, and perhaps to, a different network.  While the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) manages issues related to the trade in 
telecommunications goods and services among participating nations, 
cybersecurity standards tend to be more common in regional trade 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC Revoke and Terminate China 
Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International Telecommunications Services in the 
United States, The United States Department of Justice (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/executive-branch-agencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-china-teleco 
m-s-authorizations. 
 150. Id. 
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agreements.  The following sections describe how WTO agreements and 
RTAs between particular nations deal with international telecommunications 
trade differently.  
 
1.  WTO Provisions Relating to Digital Trade and Telecommunications  
 
The WTO’s primary goal is to promote free trade by reducing barriers 
to trade among participating nations.151  It accomplishes this goal through 
agreements negotiated and signed by most of the world’s trading nations.  
The WTO then enforces these agreements and when trade disputes arise, it 
steps in to mediate or arbitrate.  The WTO covers trade in goods, trade in 
services, and intellectual property.  Several agreements are of primary 
relevance to this paper: the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), and the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).152  
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications (the Annex) emphasizes the 
importance of telecommunications infrastructure and promotes cooperation 
amongst participating nations.153  The Annex requires WTO members to 
allow service suppliers to use any protocol of choice in supplying 
telecommunications services.154  The Annex categorizes services into four 
different modes of supply, modes 3 and 4 are relevant here.  Mode 3 
commitments clarify whether a foreign service provider can establish a 
commercial presence in the territory to deliver services, while mode 4 
commitments clarify whether an individual from a foreign WTO member 
country may be temporarily present in the territory to supply such a 
service.155 
Simultaneously, the ITA applies to trade in ICT products including 
telecommunications equipment, and controls tariffs on IT products.  The 
TBT governs technical regulations and standards including standards 
governing communication network interoperability and portability, 
encryption and security, privacy regulations, and data storage.156 
 
 151. Rosamond Hutt, The World Trade Organization. Here’s What It Actually Does, 
World Economic Forum (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/world-
trade-organization-wto-explained/. 
 152. Id. 
 153. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Telecommunications, Jan. 1, 
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. 
 154. Mark Wu, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing 
Models and Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System, RTA Exchange (Nov. 2017), 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-Mark-W 
u-Final.pdf. 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. Id. at 4.  
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2.  Telecommunications and Cybersecurity Provisions in RTAs 
 
Beyond the agreements orchestrated by the WTO, many nations have 
entered into regional trade agreements (RTAs).  The WTO Agreements do 
little in the way of influencing security-related regulatory measures, so RTAs 
can serve as a means to set boundaries on what constitutes permissible 
practice and to establish a set of common principles across a subset of WTO 
members.157  
Several RTAs contain provisions seeking to limit governments’ ability 
to require firms to disclose source code as a condition to doing business in 
one’s own territory.158  Some governments have enacted or are considering 
such requirements, fearing that certain technologies may have embedded 
backdoors that compromise privacy and national security.159  The reason to 
limit such requirements is that they could facilitate IPR theft.  That said, the 
limitations do not apply to “software used for critical infrastructure.”160  
While there may be a need to update the digital trade provisions of WTO 
multilateral agreements, the issues are complex, and any changes are likely 
years away.161  For that reason, RTAs are likely to remain the preferred 
avenue through which digital trade rules, including those governing 
telecommunications infrastructure security, evolve.162 
 
VI.  An Alternative Framework: Access Reciprocity 
 
Many cybersecurity-related provisions in RTAs are aimed at facilitating 
trade by limiting what a given party to the agreement can do to protect 
industry, privacy, and security domestically.  Meanwhile, much of the 
United States’ domestic tactics work to limit our trade with hostile partners 
and remove domestic governmental policies that slow implementation of 
new technologies.  None of these policies work cumulatively to facilitate 
trade, spur production, and affirmatively protect telecommunications 
network security.  To this end, Demchak and Shavitt suggest a policy of 
“Access Reciprocity” to curb BGP hijacks.  While their recommendation 
focuses specifically on BGP Hijacks and reciprocity in the number of PoPs 
permitted between two given nations, they suggest that the policy could be 
applied more broadly.  
 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158. Id. at 24. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 29.  
 162. Id.  
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China has ten PoPs in North America.  Meanwhile, U.S. companies 
have zero PoPs in China.163  While some U.S. telecoms such as AT&T 
advertise presence in China, it seems that presence is only by way of 
collaboration with local players.164  There are no PoPs owned and operated 
by AT&T or any other U.S. telecom in China.165  This imbalance of access 
allows China to engage in malicious behavior without risk of retaliation.166  
The observed hijacked routes described earlier come from, or are traveling 
to, allied states.167  Because of the routing table bias for shortest routes, that 
traffic is directed toward Chinese controlled PoPs in the U.S.168  If China 
Telecom had fewer PoPs, hijacks would be more difficult to achieve because 
they would be more visible to victim network administrators.169  Shavitt and 
Demchak go as far as to suggest that China Telecom should not extend 
beyond Hong Kong unless other telecoms were allowed to have PoPs in 
China.170  
The proposed policy of Access Reciprocity would incorporate a variety 
of metrics to determine the fair number of PoPs a telecom would be allowed 
to control on the soil of a foreign nation.  One important metric would be the 
hosting country’s population size.171  For example, if China Telecom is 
permitted eight PoPs in the U.S., American companies should be permitted 
three times that number of PoPs on Chinese soil sense the Chinese population 
is three times that of the U.S.  If the demand for reciprocal access is refused, 
the appropriate defense would be to prevent any telecommunications traffic 
associated with the United States from passing through a China Telecom 
PoP.172  The policy is technically feasible because such routing rules could 
be inserted in BGP’s routing tables and implemented as required.173  
Demchak and Shavitt argue that a policy of Access Reciprocity is 
desirable because it embodies interstate fairness, enhances cybersecurity for 
the U.S. and its allies, and is easy to implement technically through 
alterations in existing routing tables.174  They further suggest that any single 
nation could pursue this policy but that its efficacy in deterring malicious 
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behavior long term is contingent upon democratic civil societies across the 
globe acting in agreement.175  
Furthermore, an Access Reciprocity strategy as applied to PoPs could 
become the norm across international IT domains.  “Imagine,” Demchak and 
Shavitt implore, “if reciprocal fairness included security and privacy scrutiny 
of a Chinese manufacturer’s source code before its product or any updates 
may be imported into the U.S. or its allies – as is now the law in China.”176  
It’s interesting to consider an expanded version of Access Reciprocity, 
and how that might fit into relationships created by existing RTAs.  Central 
to the question of how such a provision could be adopted is the question of 
whether the policy would function to push companies from adversarial 
nations out of the market completely, or whether the purpose would be to 
bring them safely into the flow of commerce.  
If the purpose is to push adversarial nations out, then amending existing 
RTAs to include Access Reciprocity might work to bolster security, but it 
would likely slow the adoption of new technologies like 5G.  In this instance, 
nations connected through RTAs would agree to prohibit involvement from 
potentially hostile nations in telecommunications infrastructure unless the 
allied nations could be equally involved in the adversary’s networks.  The 
assumption here is that the adversary nations would not permit such 
involvement, and that the nations who agreed to the provision would not buy 
from the firms based in adversary nations.  If that assumption is correct, the 
side effect would be slowing 5G deployment.  That could then compromise 
the competitive position of other sectors that rely on access to 5G to innovate.  
Alternatively, the policy could work to bring adversary nations into a 
trade relationship that does not compromise national security, IPR, or 
privacy interests.  In that situation,  governments would benefit from more 
open trade but only because of a willingness to be vulnerable to attack.  The 
idea is that if both are equally vulnerable, they will be less likely to attack 
the other, knowing that a retaliation would be inevitable.  This is very 
different from the schema of an RTA, in which the parties agree upon a wide 
variety of provisions to reduce barriers to trade.  Furthermore, it relies on the 
assumption that commercial telecommunications providers would be equally 
motivated and able to participate in the other nation’s infrastructure.  It seems 
that if the sole purpose of installing PoPs in an adversary nation is to retaliate 
in the event of a hijack or other attack, that would fall into the military realm 
rather than the commercial realm. 
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VII.  Conclusion: Enhance Investment and  
Broaden Access Reciprocity 
 
The market demand for commercially available 5G networks is forcing 
the U.S. and other nations to restructure domestic policies and international 
trade relationships.  In order to facilitate competitive development of 5G 
infrastructure while protecting privacy and national security interests, a 
combination of policy changes must take place.  Access Reciprocity is a 
viable solution only where nations that adopt such policies also maintain 
competitive levels of investment in the telecommunications sector.  
On the domestic front, nations such as the U.S. that do not typically 
invest directly in commercial research and development efforts might 
consider taking a more aggressive approach to promoting commercial 
telecommunications infrastructure.  While governmental market interventions 
such as subsidies are often considered untenable in the U.S., it would be 
reasonable to do more than remove environmental protections checks on 
small telecommunications companies.  A more proactive approach is 
particularly appropriate in light of the $75B investments made by China, an 
adversary and our strongest competitor in the space.  
On the international front, allied nations could leverage Access 
Reciprocity policies to offset cybersecurity threats caused by adversary 
nations’ access to telecommunications infrastructure.  This would preserve 
valuable trade relationships while reducing the risk to privacy and national 
security.  Such policies could be incorporated into existing trade 
relationships by way of amending RTAs or creating new parallel agreements.  
That said, this strategy would only be successful when combined with an 
increase in technological investment.  The reason for that is if adversary 
nations do not permit our participation in their infrastructure, or if we lack 
the technical capabilities to participate, the policy would create a limitation 
on trade that could stunt progress and hinder competition in sectors that 
depend on 5G. 
As a follow up to this paper, it would be interesting to consider the ways 
in which China supports firms like Huawei, and whether the U.S. or its allies 
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